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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Drew Michael Williams appeals from the district court's order dismissing 
petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, he argues that the district court abused its 
discretion when it denied his request for post-conviction counsel. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
The factual background of this case, as set forth by the district court, is as 
follows: 
On November 15, 2010, Williams pleaded guilty to the charge of 
STALKING IN THE FIRST DEGREE pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 18-
7905(a) and/or (e), and 18-7906. On February 7, 2011, Williams was 
sentenced to the custody of the Idaho Department of Corrections [sic] for 
a unified term of five years, three years fixed and two indeterminate. The 
Court retained jurisdiction for 365 days. Following completion of the 
retained jurisdiction, the Court held a rider review hearing on Monday 
June 20, 2011. At the conclusion of the hearing the Court suspended the 
previously imposed sentence and placed Williams on probation with the 
Idaho State Department of Correction for a period of five years. As the 
first term of probation this Court required that "The Defendant must 
comply with all terms and condition imposed by the Court or the Probation 
Officer." Additionally, the Defendant was prohibited from consuming 
alcohol, seeking custody of his minor children without the consent of his 
probation officer, or directly contacting his minor children without the 
consent of his probation officer. 
On September 6, 2011, Williams' probation officer, Jed Dayley, filed 
a report of probation violation alleging that during his probation Williams 
had: 1) consumed alcohol; 2) failed to comply with the terms and 
conditions imposed by his probation officer when he threatened to cut 
another person's throat in a voicemail; and 3) contacted his children 
without the consent of his probation officer and therapist, by telephone. In 
addition to reporting these violations of Williams' terms of probation, 
Dayley opined that Williams was not supervisable in the community and 
recommended his original sentence be imposed. 
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On September 1 
denial of 
2011, Williams appeared in court and entered a 
probation violations. An evidentiary hearing 
was scheduled for November 9, 2011. At the evidentiary hearing this 
Court found that Williams violated the terms and condition of his probation. 
This Court then reinstated the previously suspended sentence and 
ordered Williams to serve the remaining time. Williams was given credit 
for time served. 
(R., pp.22-23, 95-96.) 
On February 9, 2012, Williams filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging 
that his attorney provided ineffective assistance when he did not challenge the 
imposition of the terms and conditions of felony domestic battery probation. (R., pp.8-
14.) The district court issued its notice of intent to deny counsel and dismiss the 
petition, on the grounds that Williams had failed to raise the possibility of a valid claim 
and lacked any supporting evidence that would allow reinstatement of probation. (R., 
pp.21-31.) Williams amended his petition (R., pp.42-57), and moved for summary 
judgment (R., pp.66-67). The state then responded and moved for summary dismissal 
of Williams' petition for post-conviction relief on the grounds that Williams failed to raise 
an issue of material fact as to the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and his other 
claims were either bare or conclusory. (R., pp.73-74, 83-86.) 
The district court re-entered its notice of intent to dismiss Williams' petition. (R., 
pp.94-106.) After Williams had the opportunity to respond to the notice, the district court 
granted the state's motion and dismissed Williams' petition. (R., pp.114-15.) Williams 




Did district court abuse its discretion it 
Willams' motion for appointment of post-conviction counsel? 
(Appellant's brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Williams failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by 
denying his motion to appoint post-conviction counsel, where the issues Williams raised 
in his post-conviction petition were frivolous? 
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ARGUMENT 
Williams Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of The District Court's Discretion In 
Denying His Request For Post-Conviction Counsel To Pursue Frivolous Claims 
A. Introduction 
The district court denied Williams' motion for appointed counsel and summarily 
dismissed his petition for post-conviction relief because "Williams [did] not have the 
possibility of a valid claim." (R., pp.25-31.) On appeal, Williams contends that the 
district court improperly denied his request for counsel, arguing that he raised the 
possibility of a valid claim. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-9.) Application of the correct legal 
standards to the facts of this case, however, demonstrates that Williams did not raise 
even the possibility of a valid claim. 
B. Standard Of Review 
A request for appointment of counsel in a post-conviction proceeding is governed 
by Idaho Code § 19-4904. ''The decision to grant or deny a request for court-appointed 
counsel lies within the discretion of the district court." Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 
789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004); see also Hust v. State, 147 Idaho 682, 683, 214 
P.3d 668, 669 (Ct. App. 2009). In reviewing the denial of a motion for appointment of 
counsel in post-conviction proceedings, "[t]his Court will not set aside the trial court's 
findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. As to questions of law, this Court 
exercises free review." Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792, 102 P.3d at 1111 (quoting 
Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 676, 678, 23 P.3d 138, 140 (2001 )). 
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C. The District Court Properly Denied Williams' Request For Appointed Counsel To 
Pursue The Frivolous Claims Alleged In His Post-Conviction Petition 
is no constitutional right counsel in post-conviction 
Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987). While a district court may, pursuant 
to Code § 19-4904, appoint counsel for an indigent post-conviction petitioner in 
certain circumstances, the court is only required to appoint counsel when a petitioner 
"alleges facts showing the possibility of a valid claim that would require further 
investigation on the defendant's behalf." Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651, 654, 152 P.3d 
12, 15 (2007}; Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793, 102 P.3d at 1112. In determining 
whether the alleged facts justify the appointment of counsel, "every inference must run 
in the petitioner's favor where the petitioner is unrepresented at that time and cannot be 
expected to know how to properly allege the necessary facts." Charboneau, 140 Idaho 
at 793-94, 102 P.3d at 1112-13. However, where the claims in the petition are so 
patently frivolous that there is no possibility that they could be developed into a viable 
claim, with or without counsel's assistance, the court may deny the request for counsel 
and proceed with the usual procedure for dismissing the meritless post-conviction 
petition. Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 529, 164 P.3d 798, 809 (2007); Hust, 147 
Idaho at 684, 214 P.3d at 670. After finding that the frivolous allegations contained in 
Williams' petition for post-conviction relief failed to allege facts showing the possibility of 
a valid claim, and that the appointment of counsel would not have assisted Williams in 
collecting additional evidence not in the record, the district court properly exercised its 
discretion and denied Williams' request for counsel. (R., pp.25-27, 29-30.) 
Williams asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying his 
request for counsel, arguing that he raised a possibly valid ineffective assistance of 
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counsel claim. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-9.) Where the petitioner alleges entitlement to 
relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel, he must show that his attorney's 
performance was objectively deficient and that he was prejudiced by that deficiency. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 
760-61, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176-77 (1988). To establish deficient performance, the 
petitioner must overcome the strong presumption that counsel's performance was 
adequate and "show that his attorney's conduct fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness." Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 153-54, 177 P.3d 362, 367-68 
(2008) (citations omitted). "[S]trategic or tactical decisions will not be second-guessed 
on appeal unless those decisions are based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of 
relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation." kl To establish 
prejudice, the petitioner must show "a reasonable probability that but for his attorney's 
deficient performance the outcome of the proceeding would have been different." kl 
Application of these legal standards to the underlying facts of Williams' case shows that 
he did not raise the possibility of a valid ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
Williams' ineffective assistance of counsel claim was premised on his attorney's 
"failure" to challenge the imposition of the terms and conditions of felony domestic 
battery probation, to which Williams himself agreed. (R., pp.10, 13-14.) When a 
petitioner claims his counsel was ineffective for failing to file or pursue a motion, "the 
district court may consider the probability of success of the motion in question in 
determining whether the attorney's inactivity constituted incompetent performance." 
Wolfv. State, 152 Idaho 64, 67,266 P.3d 1169, 1172 (Ct. App. 2011). Review of the 
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facts of Williams' case reveals challenge to 
probation would have been a frivolous 
Vviiliams argues that, because he was not convicted of 
conditions of probation he agreed to were not related 




"Williams ... misstates or misunderstands the standard by which to judge 
the reasonableness of the conditions of probation. The standard is 
whether the terms are reasonably related to the probation goals of 
rehabilitation and protection of society, rather than whether they relate to 
the underlying offense." 
(R., pp.101-02.) also State v. McCool, 139 Idaho 804, 807, 87 P.3d 291, 294 
(2004) ("A condition of probation must be reasonably related to the purpose of 
probation, rehabilitation."); State v. Wardle, 137 Idaho 808, 810, 53 P.3d 1227, 1229 
(Ct. App. 2002) ("conditions of probation must be reasonably related to the rehabilitative 
and public safety goals of probation."). 
Considering the underlying facts of Williams' criminal case, requiring him to 
comply with the terms and conditions of domestic battery probation was eminently 
reasonable and appropriate. Williams' stalking conviction arose when Williams, in 
violation of no-contact orders, entered his ex-wife's house with a knife and a roll of tape. 
(#39541 PSI, pp.2-5. 1) Williams held his ex-wife in her home against her will for more 
than six hours. (Id., p.2.) When she tried to escape or reach her phone, he threw her 
against the wall. (Id.) Running the blade of his knife against her leg, Williams 
threatened his ex-wife, telling her that neither she nor he would leave the house alive. 
1 Contemporaneous with the filing of this brief, the state filed a motion requesting the 
Court to take judicial notice of the record in Docket No. 39541, which corresponds to 
Williams' underlying criminal case. 
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(Id., pp.2-3.) Williams' PSI also showed that he had a long history of convictions for 
battery, including at least one battery against his wife. (Id., pp.7-13.) 
Considering the nature of Vvil!iams' crime and his criminal character, not only 
were the terms and conditions of probation Williams agreed to reasonably related to the 
goals of rehabilitation and protecting society, they were likely essential. Because the 
terms were reasonably related to Williams' rehabilitation and the protection of society, 
any challenge to those terms would not have been successful. Failure to bring a 
challenge to these essential terms and conditions of probation, therefore, cannot 
constitute deficient performance. Because Williams failed to allege any action that 
could constitute deficient performance by his attorney, he has failed to show that he is 
entitled to counsel to pursue his frivolous claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Even if Williams could show some deficiency in his counsel's performance, he 
would still not be entitled to post-conviction counsel to pursue his claim because he did 
not present the possibility of a valid claim of prejudice arising from his trial counsel's 
performance. Williams alleged in his petition that, if his counsel had objected to the 
challenged terms and conditions of probation, his probation would not have been 
revoked when he threatened to slash a man's throat with a knife. (R., pp.13-14.) The 
district court disagreed, explaining: 
[l]t is irrelevant whether Vvilliams' threat to his victim's cousin [that he 
would slash his throat with a knife] was a technical violation of the 
domestic battery terms of his probation. The Court found that Williams 
violated at least two other terms of his probation, and as stated in the 
Court's first Notice of Intent to Dismiss, Williams['] conviction of Stalking in 
the First degree combined with his threat to cut the throat of his victim's 
cousin, his failure to comply with two other terms of probation, and the 
opinion of his supervising officer that Williams was not supervisable 
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caused great concern for this Using considered judgment Court 
exercised discretion in revoking Williams' probation. 
1 
Whether or not Williams had agreed the specific conditions of domestic battery 
probation would not have made any difference in revocation of his probation. As the 
district court noted, Williams demonstrated a "complete disregard for the terms of 
probation." (R., p 30.) Williams' threatening to slash another man's throat with a knife 
no doubt played a substantial role in the district court's decision to revoke his probation, 
not because it was a technical violation of his probation-Williams had several 
violations upon which probation could be revoked-but because it demonstrated that 
probation was not accomplishing its goal of rehabilitating a violent offender. Because 
Williams could not ultimately show prejudice in this case, his ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim was frivolous and the district court properly denied his request for post-
conviction counsel. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's dismissal 
of William's frivolous petition for post-conviction relief and denial of his request for post-
conviction counsel. 
DATED this 14th day of January, 2014. 
Deputy Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 14th day of January, 2014, served a true 
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy 
addressed to: 
SHAWN F. WILKERSON 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
Deputy Attorney General 
RJS/pm 
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